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Abstract
This article surveys the theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation. The focus is
normative: we are looking at the design of an optimal tax structure from the standpoint
of both equity and efficiency. The gist of this survey is that the optimal design crucially
depends on the assumed bequest motives. Alternative bequest motives are thus analyzed
either in isolation or combined. (JEL codes: H21, H23, H24, E6, D64)
Keywords: Estate tax, inheritance tax, bequests, public finance
1 Introduction
Taxes are rarely popular but those on wealth transfers are particularly
controversial. A number of countries such as Canada and Italy are with-
out an inheritance or an estate tax and some contemplate to phase it out in
the near future. Opponents of the ‘death tax’ as they have dubbed it claim
that it is unfair and immoral. It adds to the pain suffered by mourning
families and it prevents small business from passing from generation to
generation. Because of many loopholes, people of equivalent wealth pay
different amounts of tax depending on their acumen at tax avoidance.
It hits families that were surprised by death (and it is therefore sometimes
called a tax on sudden death). It penalizes the frugal and the loving par-
ents who pass wealth on to their children, reducing incentive to save and to
invest.
Supporters of the tax, in contrast, retort that it is of all taxes the most
efficient and the most equitable. They assert that it is highly progressive and
counterweight existing wealth concentration. They also argue that it has few
disincentive effects since it is payable only at death and that it is fair since it
concerns unearned resources. For a number of social philosophers and
classical economists, estate or inheritance taxation is the ideal tax.
Clearly, death taxation more than any other generates controversy at all
levels: political philosophy, economic theory, political debate, and public
opinion. The truth probably lies between these two opposite camps.
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For economists this tax like all taxes should be judged against the two
criteria of equity and efficiency to which one could add that of simplicity
and compliance.
In this survey,1 we focus on the criteria of equity and efficiency. Equity
is hard to gauge. It has inter- and intragenerational aspects that can only
be measured by relying on some normative criterion. Efficiency implies
minimizing distortions to economic activity with an important dynamic
dimension. Inheritance taxes affect incentive governing the choice between
consuming now and bequeathing. The gist of this survey is that inheritance
taxation cannot be analyzed separately from other taxes and that its impli-
cations in terms of efficiency and equity depend on why people leave assets
when they die.
As a benchmark, we consider a dynamic model without bequest and
study the optimal structure of taxation in the absence of bequests.
Assuming that taxes can be levied on saving and labor income and are
distortive, we want to see how this tax structure is affected when bequests
are introduced and can be taxed as well.
As it will appear, the resulting tax structure depends on the bequest
model chosen. One model states that bequests are simply an accident.
People do not know how long they will live and so they keep more
money than they turn out to need. If bequests are accidental, estate tax-
ation is quite efficient. However, if people are motivated to work and to
save by the idea of leaving their families an inheritance, the tax will be
distortionary. The impact of the distortion will depend on the bequest
motive. If people have a specific amount they wish to leave to their chil-
dren regardless of their needs and their behavior, the outcome will be
different from what it would be if the amount bequeathed is determined
by a concern for the welfare of the heirs.
The survey deliberately adopts a theoretical and normative view.2 It
studies how transfers between generations ought to be taxed along with
other tax tools and according to some welfare criterion. The type of tax
that is thus obtained does not necessarily correspond to existing taxes.
To characterize the tax structure, one first has to distinguish taxation at
death from taxation on inter vivos gifts which can have different rates. One
also distinguishes three broad categories of death taxes. An estate tax is
based on the total estate of the donor. An inheritance tax, on the other
hand, is based on the share received by each donee and tax rate scales and
thresholds depend on the relationship between the donor and the donee.
1 See also the recent survey by Boadway et al. (2010).
2 For an empirical survey, see Arrondel et al. (1997), Pestieau (2003) and Gale et al. (2000).
This is not the first theoretical survey. See e.g. Batina and Ihori (2000), Erregeyers and
Vandevelde (1997), Aaron and Munnell (1992), Kaplow (2000), Kopczuk (2001).
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Finally, the accession tax is based on the share received by the donee plus
his other assets. One would hope that the theory will indicate which of
these forms is the most desirable.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief
overview of actual wealth transfer taxation and of alternative bequest
models. Section 3 develops the optimal tax structure under alternative
models. We proceed in steps. We first assume that individuals are identical
but for age and generation and that the government can control the capital
stock. Then we introduce restrictions to the ability of government of con-
trolling aggregate saving and we consider individual heterogeneity. Section
4 looks at a number of theoretical issues regarding the choice between
estate and inheritance taxation, differential taxation of bequests and inter
vivos gifts, the coexistence of different bequest motives within the same
society, the transmission of human capital and finally the non observa-
bility of inherited wealth.
2 Institutions, taxes, and motives
2.1 Institutions and wealth transfer taxes
The nature of wealth transfers is undoubtedly affected by the legal insti-
tutions that govern their transmission, and the potential economic effects
depend directly on the motive for the transfer. Before considering some
facts on wealth transfer taxation, let us look at alternative institutions and
motives.
2.1.1 Legal institution
Political economy is a growing field that deals with the effect of institu-
tions on policy outcomes. A considerable amount of work has been done
linking budgetary institutions and budget deficits, fiscal federation, and
the size of the government, electoral rules and fiscal policy, to take three
well-known examples. In the same vein, it would be interesting to link the
legal institution regulating bequest and the actual practice of gift and
estate transfers.
Legal institutions vary greatly from country to country. With regard to
the institutional setting for private wealth transfers, two important dimen-
sions are the freedom of bequest and the taxation of transfers. Table 1
joins these two dimensions, showing how countries such as the USA and
the UK can be contrasted with France and Germany.3
At death, two main types of taxes are levied on wealth transfers. The
first is the estate tax, which is levied on the total estate of the donor,
3 Masson and Pestieau (1997).
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regardless of the characteristics and the number of recipients. This tax is
used both in the USA and in the UK. The second type is the inheritance
tax levied on the share received by the recipient. Inheritance taxation
typically includes a variety of rate scales and thresholds that depend on
the relationship between donor and recipient. Most European countries,
with the exception of the UK and to a lesser extend Italy, have inheritance
taxation.
Table 2 provides some information on the structure of inheritance tax-
ation in a number of European Union countries. Tax rates that are applied
when wealth is transmitted to children or to strangers ‘in blood’ vary from
country to country, as does the level of exemption. The taxes provide
special treatment for spouses and charitable contributions. The final col-
umns of Table 2 record the extent to which inter-vivos transfers are subject
to the same treatment as bequests. Yet in reality, gifts are subject to much
lower effective tax as they can benefit from substantial exemption for each
child and each year.
In general, estate taxation gives one total freedom to bequeath one’s
wealth to anyone or anything. Disinheritance is possible, as long as the
decedent prepares an explicit will. Inheritance taxation, on the other hand,
often comes with the legal obligation to bequeath one’s wealth to one’s
children, if any, and with an equal sharing of most of the estate. Donors
have some freedom to do as they wish with a small fraction of the estate,
but this fraction declines with the number of children. As the relation
between recipient and donor gets more distant, the inheritance tax treat-
ment becomes less and less generous.
The relative merits of the estate-type and the inheritance-type taxation
are clear. The first is simple and relatively easy to administer, leaving all
discretion to donors to dispose of their wealth as they wish. This means
that it is possible to compensate some children over others for differences
in income or need and that it is possible to disinherit one’s children. In
contrast, the inheritance tax is more equitable than the estate tax in that it
Table 1 Legal institutions regulating wealth transfers
Taxation
Freedom of bequest None Estate Inheritance
Absolute Canada USA, UK –
Restricted to children
and equal sharing
– – France, Germany
Source: Masson and Pestieau (1997).
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lightens the tax load of large families. Yet, it does not allow for compen-
satory treatment of children with uneven endowments.4
Basically, estate taxation reflects a concept of the family and of the state
that is quite different from the one that governs inheritance taxation. If
one trusts parents to be fair in disposing of their estate, and if one believes
that intrafamily inequality is as important as interfamily inequality, then
what is desirable is a combination of freedom of bequest and a very low
estate tax.
On the other hand, if one does not trust parents to make compensatory
transfers within the family, and wealth varies enormously across families,
then high inheritance taxation with mandatory equal sharing seems to be
the best solution. We come back on this in Section 4.1.
The regulation of estate division can have surprising implications. It has
been shown that in agricultural France, equal sharing, unlike total free-
dom of bequeathing, has induced families to have fewer children. The
traditional objective of parents in an agricultural environment has been
to keep the estate from being divided. This was possible with primogeni-
ture, but not with equal sharing. Therefore, the only choice left was to
have one, or at most, two children.5 During the English Middle Ages, the
frequency of remarriage, along with existing societal values, traditionally
led to the mistreatment of stepchildren by stepparents. To prevent disin-
heritance, equal division was imposed. When both the demographic and
the societal evolution made such situations less likely, England moved
back to unrestricted bequeathing. In contrast, most of Continental
Europe maintained restrictive equal sharing.6
2.1.2 Importance of wealth transfer taxes
Wealth transfer taxation is different in the USA from Continental Europe.
Besides the difference analyzed above between estate and inheritance tax-
ation, estate taxation in the USA is known to concern only the very
wealthy households. Generally speaking, the deductible—the amount
below which there is no taxation—is 10 times higher in the USA than in
France and 50 times higher than in Belgium. Regardless of the type of
wealth transfer taxation, the yield is uniformly low. Table 3 provides for a
sample of OECD countries the relative yield of wealth taxation, which
barely exceeds 1% of total revenue. In 2006 only Belgium, France, and
Japan exceeded that level. Italy and Sweden have abolished their inherit-
ance tax.
4 Cremer and Pestieau (1988) argue that tax rates that decrease with the degree of consan-
guinity can be redistributive.
5 Rosenthal (1991).
6 Brenner (1985).
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Over time, the evolution of estate, inheritance, and gift taxes has not
been uniform. Figures 1 and 2 show stability in the USA and the USA,
after a drastic decline for the latter in the early 1970s. In contrast, France
has seen an increase with the arrival of the Left to the government in 1981.
Japan and Spain are rather stable. Clearly, wealth taxes do not reduce
reliance on other taxes. In some cases, e.g. France, inheritance taxes are
imposed in conjunction with an annual wealth tax, but wealth tax yields
are even lower that those of wealth transfer taxes.7
Table 3, even if it were made more complete, would not allow for a fair
comparison of the wealth transfer tax system across countries. The top
marginal rate in the French inheritance tax is lower that the top marginal
tax rate in the USA estate and gift tax. However, the exempt amounts are
much higher in the USA than in France. Besides, in the USA the tax base
is the whole estate, whereas in France it is the amount received by each
heir. Note also that in France, rates are substantially higher on ‘strangers
in blood’, and the exemption much lower. Finally, in France, assets such
Table 3 Wealth transfer taxes as a percentage of total tax revenues, 1965–2006
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006
Belgium 1.17 1.06 0.76 0.82 0.59 0.71 0.76 0.97 1.30 1.39
Denmark 0.65 0.36 0.38 0.44 0.47 0.56 0.47 0.45 0.40 0.43
Germany 0.22 0.23 0.14 0.18 0.22 0.34 0.26 0.39 0.53 0.46
Ireland 1.89 1.25 1.12 0.35 0.30 0.39 0.44 0.67 0.50 0.62
Greece 0.86 1.35 1.00 1.22 0.95 1.23 0.97 0.80 0.42 0.34
Spain 1.05 0.86 0.79 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.51 0.63 0.74 0.74
France 0.56 0.72 0.72 0.57 0.61 0.95 0.82 1.07 1.19 1.04
Italy 0.85 0.64 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.15 0.20 0.01 0.01
Luxembourg 0.38 0.48 0.32 0.32 0.27 0.29 0.27 0.27 0.39 0.39
The Netherlands 1.08 0.59 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.50 0.61 0.90 0.86 0.86
Austria 0.26 0.23 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.01 0.14 0.12
Portugal 2.02 1.47 0.86 0.22 0.83 0.50 0.21 0.25 0.08 0.01
Finland 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.37 0.38 0.59 0.70 0.70
Sweden 0.39 0.36 0.25 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.16 0.22 0.07 0.01
UK 2.62 2.01 0.82 0.59 0.69 0.65 0.58 0.62 0.70 0.74
USA 2.06 1.68 1.45 1.15 0.82 1.00 0.98 1.22 0.90 0.89
Japan 0.71 0.94 0.97 0.71 1.18 1.47 2.02 1.31 1.14 1.06
Estate. inheritance and gift taxes as a percentage of total taxation.
Source: OECD (2008), Revenue Statistics 1965–2006, Paris, OECD.
7 See Smith (2001) for more information.
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as agricultural and forestland, term life insurance benefits, and artwork
donated to the government are exempted from inheritance taxation.
It would seem that in the balance between avoidance and evasion,
Americans favor avoidance, and Europeans, evasion. This contrast
raises an interesting question. Given that the death tax yield is the same
in the USA and in Europe, is it better to elude its burden by giving away
money to foundations or by investing it in tax havens such as Luxembourg
or Switzerland? In addition to tax evasion, the European Union is engaged
in an important race to the bottom regarding financial capital income
Figure 1 Wealth transfer taxes as % of total tax revenues. Source: OECD
(2008), Revenue Statistics 1965–2006, Paris, OECD.
Figure 2 Wealth transfer taxes as % of GDP. Source: Revenue Statistics of
OECD member countries, Paris, OECD, 2008.
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taxation. This can have some effect on wealth transfer taxation, as has
been the case in the USA with estate taxation. The difference is that the
European Union does not have a supranational government to regulate
such tax competition. For example, tax competition is invoked in Italy in
favor of repealing the inheritance tax. In Belgium, the Flemish region has
lower rates and higher exemptions that the rest of the country.
2.2 Taxonomy of transfers motives
It is now widely agreed that to understand the importance and the role of
gifts and estate transfers one needs to have a better grasp of the donor’s
motives, if any. Consider two examples concerning gifts and bequests.
First, when the transfer takes the form of gifts it may be unclear whether
they are ‘true gifts’, due to altruism, or effectively involve some sort of
exchange (the donee provides services to the donor). It is clear that a
number of effects would differ under the two cases. Second, in the case
of bequests we may not know whether they are left accidentally, because of
the incompleteness of annuity markets, or intentionally for motives which
rely on some type of altruism. Again, depending on the case, the effects of
bequests on income inequality, capital accumulation, education could be
quite different.
We examine briefly a number of bequest motives that have been offered
in the literature and sketch their implications focusing on those that are
testable.8
2.2.1 Pure dynastic altruism: altruistic bequest
Parents care about the likely lifetime utility of their children and hence
about the welfare of future generations.9
Accordingly, wealthier parents make larger bequests and holding par-
ent’s wealth constant children with higher labor earnings will receive smal-
ler bequests. There is also a tendency for parents to leave different
amounts to different children in order to equalize their incomes. Finally,
pure altruism typically leads to the Ricardian equivalence: parents com-
pensate any intergenerational redistribution by the government through
matching bequests. In consequence, debt and pay-as-you go social security
have no effect on capital accumulation.
8 See also on this Pestieau (2000), Cox (1987).
9 Among the classical references, one has Barro (1974), Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986). See
also Altonji et al. (1992).
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2.2.2 Joy of giving: paternalistic bequest (bequest-as-last-consumption)
Parents here are motivated not by altruism but by the direct utility they
receive from the act of giving.10 This phenomenon is also referred to as
‘warm glow’ giving. It can be explained by some internal feeling of virtue
arising form sacrifice in helping one’s children or by the desire of control-
ling their life. Formally these bequests appear in the utility function as a
consumption expenditure incurred in the last period of life. Ceteris par-
ibus, they are subject to income and price effects but do not have any
compensatory effect, namely they are not intended to smoothen consump-
tion across generations. A crucial element is whether what matters to the
donor is the net or the gross of tax amount.
2.2.3 Exchange-related motives: strategic bequests
In their canonical form, exchange-related models consider children choos-
ing a level of ‘attention’ to provide to their parents and parents remuner-
ating them in the prospect of bequest.11 The exchanges can involve all
sorts of non pecuniary services and they can be part of a strategic game
between parents and children. Strategic bequests as they were originally
presented imply that parents extract all the surplus from their children by
playing them against each other.
Strategic or exchange bequests depend on the wealth and the needs of
the donor; they are not compensatory between parents and children and
they do not need to be equal across children.
2.2.4 No bequest motive: accidental bequests
Up to this point, we have considered planned bequests. Whatever the
underlying motive they were voluntary.12 We now consider unplanned
or accidental bequests which result from a traditional life-cycle model.
Accordingly, people save during their working lives in order to finance
consumption when retired. Bequests occur solely because wealth is held in
bequeathable form due to imperfections in annuity markets or the need to
have precautionary savings. The main implication of that form of bequests
is that even a 100% estate tax rate should not have any disincentive effect
on the amount of bequest.
In this survey, we will show that the tax structure depends crucially on
the type of bequest motive considered. Table 4 gives an overview of some
of the expected implications of wealth transfers for each of these
10 Andreoni (1990), Bevan and Stiglitz (1979), Glomm and Ravikunar (1992), Kotlikoff
and Spivak (1981).
11 Bernheim et al. (1985), Cremer et al. (1993), Cremer and Pestieau (1991, 1996, 1998).
12 Davies (1981), Abel (1985).
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alternative models. It summarizes the results of the existing literature on
the subject. Concerning disparity between parents and children or among
children, only altruistic bequests are expected to reduce them. The other
types of bequests have other concerns. As to the division of estate
both altruistic and strategic bequests are not supposed to follow the
equal division solution that is adopted by default. Altruistic bequests
are more generous for disadvantaged children and strategic bequests are
higher for children providing the kind of attention parents particularly
desire.
Contrary to what is often said, the effect of bequests on social inequality
is rather uncertain. Only altruistic or paternalistic bequests ought to con-
tribute to social immobility. Finally, as it is well known, altruistic bequests
as long as they are operative lead to the Ricardian equivalence and any
taxation of accidental bequest does not affect their amount.
To sum up, one clearly sees that there are two dividing lines. The first
division is between pure altruism and the other motives; it concerns intra-
and intergenerational redistribution. The second is between unplanned
and planned bequest, the former being indifferent to any restriction
including taxation while the latter is affected by any obstacle to the free-
dom to bequeath.
2.3 Canonical model
We use a Diamond-style overlapping generation model. Identical individ-
uals are assumed to live two periods, consuming in both, providing some
Table 4 Implications of bequests motives
Types of bequests
Accidental Altruistic Paternalistic Exchange
Effect on intrafamily disparity
Disparity between
parents and children
Neutral Equalizing Neutral Neutral
Disparity among siblings Neutral Equalizing Neutral Neutral









Effect of fiscal policy
Public debt on
consumption
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labor in the first one.13 Population is increasing at the rate n. The govern-
ment has an exogenously given revenue requirement which has to be
financed. through taxes on income from labor and capital and on estate
transfer, if any. Individual can derive some utility from transferring
resources to their offsprings.
The problem of the representative consumer is to maximize his utility
subject to the budget constraint.
bt þ !t‘t ¼ ct þ dtþ1 þ xtþ1
1þ %tþ1 ð1Þ
where bt is inherited wealth, xtþ1 is the amount of bequests, !t is the
consumer wage (net of tax), Xtþ1 the consumer rate of interest (after tax
interest rate), ct, first period consumption, ‘t, labor supply and dtþ1,
second period consumption. The preferences are represented by the fol-
lowing utility function:
ut ¼ u ct; dtþ1; ‘tð Þ þ Btþ1
¼ u ctð Þ þ u dtþ1ð Þ  h ‘tð Þ þ Btþ1
ð2Þ
where Btþ1 is the utility derived from bequeathing if any,  and  are
positive parameters, u() is strictly concave and h() strictly convex. The
additive specification is used for the sake of simplicity.
Consider now five models:
(1) No bequests: ¼ 0, b¼ x¼ 0.
(2) Accidental bequests: ¼ 0,  ¼ ~ ; where ~ is the factor of time pref-
erence and  is the survival probability. There is a probability  that
the individual will live till the end of the second period and (1 ) that
he will die at the end of the first period. In the latter case, btþ1¼ dtþ1/
(1þ n) for a fraction (1 ) of children whose parents decease
prematurely.
(3) Paternalistic bequests: Btþ1¼ h(xtþ1) and btþ1¼ xtþ1/(1þ n).





with again btþ1¼ xtþ1/(1þ n).
(5) Exchange-based bequests:
Btþ1 ¼ h atþ1ð Þ and ut ¼ u ct  v agt
 
; ‘t; atþ1
 þ u dtþ1ð Þ  hð‘tÞ
13 Diamond (1965).
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where atþ1 is attention received, a
g
t is attention given representing a
monetary cost of v agt
 
that is paid by a bequest bt. In the strategic
bequest vein, we assume that bt ¼ v agt
 
.
We have three tax instruments: w, r, x, namely a proportional tax on
earnings, interest income, inherited wealth. The government budget con-
straint is:
wt ‘t þ
rt st1 þ xt xt
1þ n ¼ R
where R is the (per capita) revenue requirement, wt and rt (!t and Xt) are
the producer (consumer) factor prices (w¼w!; r¼ r X) and st1 is
saving.
3 Optimal taxation of factor income and wealth transfer
3.1 The overlapping generation model
In the Diamond (1965) model each generation lives for two periods, con-
suming in both and working in the first. There are no bequests and the
lifetime budget constraint for the representative household born in period
t may be written:
ct þ dtþ1
1þ %tþ1 ¼ !t‘t: ð3Þ
It is clear that endowing the government with two instruments, taxes on
labor income (w¼w!) and capital income (r¼ r X) is equivalent to
allowing the government to tax first- and second-period consumption at
possibly different rates. A zero-tax on capital income—a labor income
tax—would result in uniform taxation of consumption in the two
periods.14
We now characterize the optimal steady-state taxes resulting from a
utilitarian objective X
tut ð4Þ
where 0< <1 is the factor of social time preference and
ut ¼ u ct; dtþ1; ‘tð Þ ð5Þ
is the individual utility function. Two general results have been obtained.
First with the government able to redistribute resources across generations
14 See Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Pestieau (1974).
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through debt policy, pay-as-you-go social security or any other devices the
marginal product of capital converges to the population growth rate
divided by the factor of time preference ((1þ n) /), namely the modified
golden rule. Second, optimal taxes on labor and capital should follow the
standard analysis of static optimal tax theory.
Maximizing (5) subject to (1) yields the demand function for c(!t, Xtþ1),
d(!t, Xtþ1) and ‘(!t, Xtþ1) which substituted back in the utility function
yields the indirect utility function:










where  is the marginal utility of income ¼ @u/@I and s is saving. We use I
to denote non labor income, if any.
There is a production sector represented by a CRS production function
relating output Yt to capital Kt and labor Lt:
Yt ¼ F Kt;Ltð Þ
or




¼ f ktð Þ
with y¼Y/L and k¼K/L. With perfect competition factor payments
equal the value of marginal products:
wt ¼ F0L Kt;Ltð Þ and 1þ rt ¼ F0K Kt;Ltð Þ:
We assume total depreciation after one period and Lt¼ ‘tNt where
Nt¼Nt1(1þ n) is the size of generation t.
In this simple economy, the dynamics is conducted by the capital accu-
mulation equation:
Ktþ1 ¼ Ntst;
where st¼ (!t, Xtþ1)¼!t c(!t, Xtþ1).
Under some assumptions, one can show that ktþ1 converges to a unique
steady-state k* which can be compared to the steady-state value k^ which
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For the time being we assume that the economy is on the modified golden
rule growth path through some appropriate intergenerational transfers by
the government. So doing we focus on the optimal tax structure abstract-
ing from dynamic efficiency considerations.
The government’s budget constraint is simply:
wt ‘t þ rt
dt
1þ %tð Þ 1þ nð Þ ¼ R; ð6Þ
where R is given. The second term on the left is the revenue from capital
income taxation which concerns the previous generation (st1¼ dt/
(1þ Xt)).
We solve this problem by differentiating the Lagrangean expression,
L ¼
X
t v !t; %tþ1ð Þ þ 	 wt ‘t !t; %tþ1ð Þ þ rt
dt !t1; %tð Þ
1þ %tð Þ 1þ nð Þ  R
  	
;
with respect to !t and Xt. This yields:
@L
@!t
¼ t t‘t þ 	 wt
@‘t
@!t





























Evaluating (7) and (8) in the steady-state, while adding and subtracting the


















1þ %ð Þ2 











1þ nð Þ 1þ %ð Þ ¼ 0
ð10Þ
where





1þ nð Þ 1þ %ð Þ ;
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and thee denotes the compensated effects. Given our assumption on
















1þ nð Þ 1þ %ð Þ
 !




This equation characterizes the relative levels of the tax rates on earn-
ings and capital income with the absolute levels being determined by the
government’s revenue requirement R. As usual this characterization
depends on compensated and not gross derivatives. Assume for simplicity






% 1þ rð Þ ð12Þ
where the ~" are the compensated elasticities. If labor is completely inelastic
along the compensated supply curve, the optimal tax on interest income is
zero because the tax on earnings is equivalent to a lump-sum tax. The
argument is reversed when the demand for future consumption is inelastic.
In general, however, there is no particular reason to believe that either tax
will be zero nor that both taxes are the same.
Let us come back to the assumption that the economy is on the modified
golden rule path, that is, on the assumption that the government can
control capital. From (10) one can see that if 1þ n 6¼ (1þ r)  we have
an additional term in either (11) or (12). In other words these taxes are
not only used to finance R but also to foster or discourage capital accu-
mulation depending on whether the rate of interest is higher or lower than
the rate of population growth divided by the discount factor.
As shown by Atkinson and Sandmo (1980) too little capital may call for
a lower taxation of earnings and a higher tax on interest income than when
the modified golden rule holds. This apparent paradox can be explained
by noting that with a log-linear utility function saving depends only on
earnings and not on the interest rate.15
We shall now introduce transfers into this model and successively con-
sider the motives discussed in Section 2.2. Within each setting we study the
design of factor income and wealth transfer taxes. To do so it is convenient
to distinguish the case where the government has the instruments to secure
the modified golden rule from the case where the government cannot fully
control the capital stock.
15 Naturally, their argument applies also to other utility functions.
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The accidental bequest case is not much different from the case without
bequest. Saving is affected by survival probabilities. Accidental transfers
are taxed at 100%, without affecting the supply of saving. The part of
public spending (if any) which exceeds the proceeds of the transfer tax is
financed through labor and capital income taxes designed a` la Atkinson–
Sandmo.
3.3 Pure altruism
To keep things relatively simple, we assume that ¼ 0 so that d¼ 0. In
other words, people live only one period and only save for bequeathing.16
This assumption implies that the tax on saving is also the tax on wealth
transfer.17 Then, the social planner’s problem at time 0 is to maximize:X1
t¼0
tu ct; ‘tð Þ;
subject to the resource constraint
F kt; ‘tð Þ ¼ 1þ nð Þktþ1 þ ct þ R;
and to the revenue constraint
1þ nð Þztþ1 ¼ 1þ %tð Þzt þ 1þ %tð Þkt þ !t‘t  F kt; ‘tð Þ þ R;
where z denotes per worker public debt. Recall that k is the per worker
capital stock while R per worker public spending and that the production
function exhibits constant returns to scale.
Chamley (1986), Judd (1985) and Coleman (2000) show the following:
– if one could tax as much as possible initial wealth k0, one could do
without using any distortionary tax;
– if this first-best solution is not accessible, one will have initially a tax on
both earnings and saving (that is bequests); and
– in the long run the tax on saving tends to 0.
We restrict ourselves to proving the last point which represents the main
result. The government’s objective is the same as that of the representative
16 The classical papers on this are Chamley (1986) and Judd (1985).
17 We have the following equality between saving and bequest:
st ¼ xtþ1 ¼ ð1þ nÞktþ1:
CESifo Economic Studies, 2011 page 17 of 37
Wealth Transfer Taxation












t u ct; ‘tð Þ þ 
t F kt; ‘tð Þ  ct  1þ nð Þktþ1  Rð Þ½
þ 	t 1þ nð Þztþ1  1þ %tð Þzt  1þ %tð Þkt  !t‘t þ F kt; ‘tð Þ  R½ ;
where 
 and 	 are the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource
and the revenue constraint, respectively. The FOC with respect to z and k
in the steady-state are:
1þ %ð Þ ¼ 1þ n; ð13Þ
and
 1þ nð Þ
þ 
 1þ rð Þ þ 	 r %ð Þ ¼ 0: ð14Þ
Combining these two equations give:

 1þ %ð Þ þ 
 1þ rð Þ þ 	 r %ð Þ ¼ 0:
This yields (
þ	) (r X)¼ 0 and thus r¼ 0, so that (13) implies (1þ r)
¼ 1þ n. In words, we have the modified golden rule and most notably, a
zero tax on savings which correspond to bequests in our setting.
Consequently, wealth transfers are not taxed in the steady state.18
Chamley–Judd’s result has become the standard rule for a number of
public economists and particularly macroeconomists. However, it has also
been challenged on various grounds. It relies on a set of strong assumption
which have been questioned. In any case the zero tax result only applies to
the steady-state; during the transition period, wealth transfers along with
capital income are subject to taxation.
In a recent paper, Saez (2002) introduces a progressive tax on capital
income (instead of a linear one) in the Chamley–Judd model. Under some
plausible assumption, he shows that such a tax is desirable; it drives all the
large fortunes down a finite level and produces a truncated long-run
wealth distribution.
3.4 Joy of giving
Unlike in the case of pure altruism, the objective of individuals and that of
the social planner may now diverge. Each individual maximizes:
u ct; dtþ1; ‘tð Þ þ v xtþ1ð Þ;
18 This result generalizes to the case where >0 and d>0. However, the proof becomes
much more complicated.
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xt þ !t‘t ¼ ct þ dtþ1 þ 1þ nð Þ 1þ 
xð Þxtþ1
1þ %tþ1 :
In a laissez-faire equilibrium, each individual chooses ‘t, ct, dtþ1 and xtþ1
given factor prices !t and Xt and inherited wealth xt. As to the social
optimum, one faces the issue of whether or not laundering individual
utilities. Harsanyi (1995) and Hammond (1988) have advocated ‘excluding
all external preferences, even benevolent ones, from our social utility func-
tion’. Advocates of a utilitarian approach, on the other hand, argue that
the social planner cannot paternalistically modify individuals’ preferences.
We shall use a generalized objective which admits the two approaches as
special case. Denoting the social factor of time preference by , social




s u cs; dsþ1; ‘sð Þ þ "v xsþ1ð Þ½ ;
where 0 " 1 with "¼ 0 for the non utilitarian and "¼ 1 for the utilitar-
ian case.
With this setting, the steady-state rule of optimal capital accumulation is
the modified golden rule. The key issue is the treatment of xt. For "¼ 1 the
first-best optimal value of x is that for which v0(x)¼ 0. In other words
without laundering out utilities the social planner will push for a very high
value of x (that could be infinity). In a first-best world, such a solution
could be implemented through a subsidy on x financed by public debt. It is
clearly not reasonable and such a pathological outcome provides an argu-
ment in favor of laundering out the joy of giving from the donors’ welfare.
In the second-best, with linear taxes on earnings, capital income and
bequests, the revenue constraint is given by:
R ¼ wt ‘t þ rt st1 þ xt 1þ nð Þxt;
which can also be written as:
R ¼ wt ‘t þ t
dt
1þ ‘t þ 
x





1þ %t þ 
x
t
is the total (or effective) tax on transfers. Observe that bequests are subject
to a double tax: first, the tax on savings, r, and then the specific tax on
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transfers x. The total tax on bequest is higher than that on second period
consumption if x> r/(1þ Xt), which occurs when x>0.
Michel and Pestieau (2002) show that with no laundering the tax struc-
ture is not much different from (11). Taxes on earnings, on second period
consumption and on bequests only depend on compensated elasticities and
on the revenue requirement when the capital stock is directly controlled. In
the case of zero cross elasticities, the tax on second period consumption
(r) may be higher than the estate tax (x) if the own compensated elasticity
of second period consumption is lower than that of bequests. When there
is laundering, bequest loses its direct social utility and is thus subject to a
relatively higher tax.
3.5 Exchange
We will use an exchange model of the strategic type in which parents
obtain attention from their children in exchange of some bequests. By
playing their children against each other they control the exchange to
their full benefit.19
The utility function of an individual belonging to generation t is
given by:
u ct  v agt
 
; dtþ1; ‘t; atþ1
 
; ð15Þ
where atþ1 denotes attention received and a
g
t attention given which
requires some effort. The disutility of attention given is expressed in mon-
etary terms. First and second period budget constraints are:
!t‘t þ bt ¼ ct þ st; ð16Þ
1þ %tþ1ð Þst ¼ 1þ xtþ1
 
xtþ1 þ dtþ1: ð17Þ
In addition, we have
xtþ1 ¼ 1þ nð Þbtþ1 ð18Þ
and
v agt
  ¼ bt: ð19Þ
Equation (18) gives the straightforward relation between bequest and
inherited wealth. Equation (19) results from our strategic bequest assump-
tion: parents extract all the surplus from their children who are just paid
for the disutility of their effort.
19 We exclude collusion between children whereby they would agree to supply a minimal
amount of attention and share the inheritance; see Cigno (1991).
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Substituting (16)–(19) into (15) shows that each member of generation t
maximizes the following expression
u !t‘t  dtþ1ð Þ
1þ %tþ1 
v atþ1ð Þ 1 xtþ1
 
1þ %tþ1 ; dtþ1; ‘t; atþ1
 
:
The indirect utility is given by:
Vt ¼ V !t; %tþ1; xtþ1
 
:
The problem for the social planner is to maximize the discounted sum of
utilities,
P
tVt, subject to the revenue constraint:
R ¼ w‘þ 
rdt
1þ %tð Þ 1þ nð Þ þ
rt þ xt 1þ rtð Þ
1þ %tð Þ 1þ nð Þ v atð Þ:
We continue to assume that capital accumulation is socially optimal ( i.e.,










r þ x 1þ rð Þ
1þ rð Þ 1þ %ð Þ v
















rþ x 1þ rð Þ
1þ rð Þ 1þ%ð Þv

















rþ x 1þ rð Þ
1þ rð Þ 1þ%ð Þv








For same reasons as developed above (subsection 3.4), the overall tax on
bequests, rþ x (1þ r), may or may not be higher than that on future
consumption. In other words, there is no particular reason to believe that
the wealth transfer tax x is positive. This will depend on the relative
magnitude of the compensated derivatives which determine the overall
tax on bequests and the tax on future consumption through Atkinson
and Sandmo type rules.
To illustrate this point in the simplest possible way, assume again that
the cross elasticities are zero. Then, we have:
r þ x 1þ rð Þ
r
¼ v að Þ
@ ~d
@r 1þ %ð Þ
v0 að Þ @ ~a@x d
:
Clearly if the demand for attention is much more elastic than that for
future consumption, the tax on inheritance, x, is negative.
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3.6 Inequality and wealth transfer taxation
Up to now most of the discussion has focused on the restricted case of a
representative individual and of full control of capital by the social
planner.
On the latter issue, we have to note that with pure altruism and equality
between the individuals rate of altruism and the social planner’s time
preference factor, the modified golden rule is achieved without the gov-
ernment intervening. With the other bequest motives there is no guarantee
that the optimal accumulation of capital is achieved. Then if the govern-
ment does not have direct control of capital, it has to use tax policy to
affect the capital labor ratio. As already alluded to, if there is a need of
additional capital accumulation, because (1þ r) >(1þ n), this will not
necessarily push for less taxation of capital income and wealth transfer
and more taxation of labor income. What matters is aggregate saving and
with a log-linear function saving depends on net of tax earnings relatively
more than on the rate of interest.
Let us now consider individuals who differ in ability but have the same
utility function. As shown by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972, 1976)20 in the
presence of weak separability between consumption and leisure, there is no
need of taxation of capital within the standard OLG model. The
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem assumes that all households have identical util-
ity functions and differ in their wage rates reflecting abilities or productiv-
ities, the government maximizes a quasi-concave (welfarist) objective
function, applies a non linear income tax and could also apply linear
excise taxes. Thus if the utility function is weakly separable in goods
and labor so that u(c, d, ‘)¼ u(g(c, d), ‘) a tax on capital income (alter-
natively on d) should not be used. Diamond (2006) [see also Banks and
Diamond (2010)] discusses the robustness of the Atkinson–Stiglitz prop-
osition. He shows a number of cases in which it does not hold and in
which a taxation of capital income can be socially desirable. This occurs
when the time discount factor is not observable and correlated with prod-
uctivity, or when some initial endowment is private knowledge and corre-
lated with productivity. There is also the setting in which individuals work
in the second period and their productivity is unknown. This setting has
been widely used by the so-called ‘New Dynamic Public Finance’ (see, e.g.,
Golossov et al. (2006)). All this work that revisits the Atkinson–Stiglitz
proposition leads to the conclusion that the case for a zero taxation on
capital income is rather weak.
With all these reservations, the Atkinson–Stiglitz result can be readily
extended to the model with exchange (strategic bequest), granted that the
20 See also Stiglitz (1987).
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government controls the rate of capital accumulation.21 Naturally if the
economy does not converge to the modified golden rule, then the result
does not hold anymore: capital income and wealth transfers will be taxed
or subsidized depending on their effect on aggregate saving.22
The reason why the Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition applies to the
strategic bequest model presented above is that bequest has no effect on
the next generation. Each individual regardless of his ability and of his
generation receives from his parents exactly what he pays for.
Individual heterogeneity does make a difference in the case of ‘joy of
giving’. The reason is rather simple. Even though the donor is not inter-
ested by the impact of his gift on the next generation’s welfare the social
planner cannot ignore this incidence. A non-linear income tax on gener-
ation t does not make redundant a linear or a non-linear tax on what we
can call a distributive externality.
The difficulty is how to express this externality, how to represent the
effect of paternalistic gifts on the next generation’s welfare. A convenient
shortcut is to reduce individual heterogeneity to two levels of productivity,
low and high, with endogenous probability. Suppose that the level of
bequest has the effect of increasing the probability that the child’s receiv-
ing it has a higher productivity. In other words, we assume that inherited
wealth has the sole effect of fostering heirs’ earning capacity.23 With such
a specification we can show that with an optimal non-linear income tax it
makes sense to have a tax or a subsidy on bequest. If there is no laundering
out, a subsidy is desirable: fostering bequests implies increasing the prob-
ability of being more productive and thus the average level of human
capital.
In case of laundering out the social planner may want to tax bequests as
the joy of giving per se has no social value. We then have two opposite
forces: one in favor of subsidizing bequests because of their positive exter-
nality on human capital and the other in favor of taxing bequests because
they have no direct value for the social planner.
Note that the role of the tax-subsidy is not to redistribute income but to
correct for some positive or negative externalities. In that respect it does
not invalidate the Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition.
21 It is paradoxical that with a single individual the zero taxation of capital income does not
apply with weak separability (you need strong separability a` la Stone-Geary) and it does
with heterogeneous individuals and optimal non-linear tax. The reason is that the equiva-
lent of a non-linear income tax in a one-individual setting is the lump-sum tax (which is
ruled out); see Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
22 The extension of the Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition to estate taxation has been dis-
cussed by Kaplow (2000) and Kopczuk (2001).
23 We use the argument given by Cremer and Pestieau (2001).
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Let us now turn to the remaining bequest motives. In the model with
pure altruism, the zero capital income tax result holds with different indi-
viduals without further assumptions. See on this Chamley (1986).
With accidental bequest, on the other hand, heterogeneity of individuals
makes a difference. Indeed one can argue that under some conditions it is
not anymore desirable to have a 100% tax on accidental bequests.
Blumkin and Sadka (2004) show that a 100% estate tax can interfere
with the redistributing role of labor income taxation. This is the case
when individuals with higher ability tend to spend a lower fraction of
their marginal wealth on leisure than individuals with lower ability. As
a result estate taxation would result in a reduction in aggregate labor
earnings. Kopczuk (2003) correctly points out that accidental bequests
result from some imperfections in the annuity markets and the first-best
solution is not necessarily to tax them but rather to eliminate them.
Table 5 presents the main results obtained so far. Note that one cannot
sign the tax on wealth transfer with joy of giving and with exchange
regardless of whether or not the government controls capital.
With individuals differing in ability but with non-linear income tax, the
Atkinson–Stiglitz result applies to the cases of joy of giving and exchange.
The Atkinson–Stiglitz theorem assumes that the government can use a
wide range of instruments. The literature contains a number of models
exploring the consequences of restricting the policy environment.
For example, for administrative reasons, one can assume that the gov-
ernment cannot use non-linear tax schedules. If it is restricted to using
linear income taxes, the case for a zero tax on capital income and wealth
transfers (with accidental and exchange based bequests) is weakened.
Another line of concern is that the government may very well observe
labor earnings but not bequests. In that case, on which we come
back below, a linear tax on capital income might be desirable; see
subsection 4.4.












but with a non
linear income tax
Accidental bequest 1 1 <1
Joy of giving ± ± ±
Pure altruism 0 0 0
Exchange ± ± 0
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There is clearly the possibility that the government cannot control cap-
ital accumulation by debt policy. Then the Atkinson–Stiglitz proposition
does not apply. While it may remain true that taxes on savings and
bequests have not redistributive role, they may be useful for other reasons
(e.g., to foster or limit capital accumulation). Also these taxes can be used
when there is a conflict between individual and social preferences as it is
the case when the social planner decides to launder the offspring’s welfare
out of parents’ welfare.
Choosing between the two canonical models, the infinite lived individ-
uals model and the OLG model and even more between their implications
is not obvious. Both have in common to tell little about the nature of
optimal tax schedules in transition. Except through numerical simulation
(see e.g. Coleman 2000) we know little about the linkage between transi-
tion and long run policy. Chamley’s model and his finding of a zero tax on
capital income in the long run is striking and powerful. It quickly attracted
a majority of economists concerned by the highly distortionary nature of
such a tax. It however rests on the implausible assumption that agents live
forever or behave in an equivalent manner with respect to their heirs.
Without infinite lifetime no such result holds. This does not necessarily
mean that a positive tax on capital income and on wealth transfer is the
rule. We have seen that we could also have a subsidy. Note that the sign of
the tax then depends on a number of factors including the revenue require-
ment and whether or not there is under-accumulation.
4 Miscellaneous issues
4.1 Estate taxation or inheritance taxation
As we have seen above, there exists two main types of wealth transfer
taxes:24 the estate and the inheritance taxes which correspond to two con-
trasting views of inheritance.
For an economist, it would be interesting to see which of these two taxes
correspond best to an optimal tax. In a first-best perfect information
setting wealth transfer taxes can be designed along with the other taxes
to achieve optimal redistribution within and across families. In an asym-
metric information setting, this is less clear.
In a recent paper, Cremer and Pestieau (2001) adopt a second-best
setting in which families are better informed than the tax authorities.25
Well to do families can be induced to leave lower bequests to avoid a too
24 The accession tax is another type but that has never been applied in any country.
25 Tax authorities observe the transfer to each of the children, but do not observe parent’s
wealth and children’s ability.
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heavy tax burden. The paper studies the optimal design of a possibly
non-linear wealth transfer tax. This problem encompasses the joint deter-
mination of the tax rates, the tax base and the sharing rules. In particular,
sharing restrictions can be implemented through non-linearities in the tax
function.26
Basically it appears that the optimal tax is different from existing tax
regimes. When the social planner and the parents weight the children in
the same way, an estate tax, that is a tax based on aggregate bequest
suffices. When they adopt different weights, then one needs to use a pro-
gressive tax formula that depends on individual bequests. In other words,
we have something which resembles the inheritance tax but without com-
pulsory equal sharing. Finally, when there is a possibility of the parent
disinheriting their less endowed child, the government may find it optimal
to impose a tax schedule which implies equal sharing along with a pro-
gressive tax.
4.2 Inter vivos gifts versus bequests
In most countries inter vivos gifts are subject to lower tax rates than
bequests. Furthermore, gifts being made informally and in several install-
ments they lend themselves to tax avoidance and tax evasion more easily
than bequests. Also, in countries with inheritance taxation and mandatory
equal sharing gifts are viewed as the only way to treat children differently
according to needs, talents, or preferences.
From a theoretical viewpoint one can ask whether differential taxation
of gifts and bequests is consistent with social optimality. There are some
reasons which plead in favor of such a policy.
(i) Assume that the bulk of bequests is of accidental nature and that
planned transfers are made much before the donor’s death as inter
vivos gifts. Then it makes much sense to discriminate in favor of inter
vivos gifts.
(ii) Such a differential tax treatment fosters inter vivos gifts which are a
more effective form of transfer in the case where heirs are liquidity
constrained.
(iii) In countries where it applies, gifts cannot be subject to the same strict
equal sharing rule as bequests. Therefore, they hopefully can be used
for compensating for difference in luck or in talent among children.
For that reason they ought to benefit from tax breaks.
26 Another issue is that of differential tor treatment depending on the relation between the
donor and the donee. Typically rates are higher for strangers than for children. See
Cremer and Pestieau (1988).
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However, there are also arguments against a heavier taxation of
bequests. In particular, Cremer and Pestieau (1996, 1998) have shown
that bequests as opposed to gifts can be used to induce children to
reveal their ability and to provide a desirable amount of effort, which
they would not do if they were given outside resources too early in their
lifetime. In that respect, a tax break for inter vivos gifts is not necessarily
desirable.
4.3 Mixed motives
The theoretical literature on wealth transfer taxation tends to assume that
individual have only one type of bequest motives. The purpose of this
section is to suggest that such an approach is deficient and it proposes
to consider a society consisting of individuals with different motives. We
first turn to a society consisting of individuals who combine different
motives, namely who leave both altruistic and accidental bequests. Then
we consider a society where individuals are all either altruistic or pure
‘life-cyclers’.
4.3.1 A mix of accidental and paternalistic bequest27
It is widely believed that actual bequests are an hybrid of canonical types
analyzed above and in particular of accidental bequests (related to imper-
fect annuity markets) and of paternalistic bequests (related to some joy of
giving). In such a case, the estate consists of two components: an amount
intended by altruistic parents and an amount which results from the ‘pre-
mature’ death of parents and which represents intended second period
consumption in one overlapping generations framework. We have seen
that these two types of bequests have totally different implications.
Determining the relative importance of the time is thus crucial to design
an optimal estate tax.
To illustrate this, we use an isoelastic utility function:
u c; d; xð Þ ¼ c11= þ  d11= þ  x11=  1 1

 1
with >1 to make sure that an estate taxes x has a depressive effect on x.
Isoelasticity implies homotheticity, a property that we shall use below.
Labor supply in the first period is inelastic. One shows that
dtþ1 ¼  1þ rtþ1ð Þ~s rtþ1ð Þ wt þ htð Þ
27 This section follows Michel and Pestieau (2002) and Pestieau and Sato (2008). On this
subject, see also Blumkin and Sadka (2004).
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1þ nð Þxtþ1 1þ xt
  ¼ 1 ð Þ 1þ rtþ1ð Þ~s rtþ1ð Þ wt þ htð Þ
where ht is inherited wealth, with






while  is the share of saving devoted to second period consumption, ~sðrÞ
is the saving ratio, x and  are respectively the tax on voluntary
and accidental bequests, respectively, and Rt is a uniform lump-sum pay-
ment financed by wealth transfer taxes. Clearly if ¼ 0, (¼ 1) there
is no intended bequest. If  ¼ 1; (longevity is certain) there is no acci-
dental bequests. In this approach inherited wealth varies across individ-
uals. It depends on one’s parent’s intended bequest xt, second period
consumption dt and longevity t. At each period, the revenue constraint
is simply:
Rt ¼ 1þ rtð Þst1
1þ n
xt 1 ð Þ
1þ xt
þ t 1 ð Þ
 
where the upper-bar denotes average values. If the social planner’s object-
ive is to minimize the steady-state coefficient of variation of inherited
wealth, one can easily show that ¼ 1 and x is likely to be between 0
and 1 for  1. Note that here Rt is not a fixed amount of public spending
but an endogenous lump-sum transfer. In the normal case when one
cannot distinguish bequest motives and there is a single rate of taxation
 ¼ x1þx then one shows that the optimal value of this unique rate repre-
sents a compromise between the equity objective and the desire of not
discouraging wealth accumulation. The closer  is to 1, the closer the
tax to 1.
In this very simple model the only source of inequality is longevity .
When  ¼ 1 or when ¼ 1, then there is no inequality. Introducing a
second source of heterogeneity, e.g., different productivities, is surely
more realistic. In that case, as shown by Blumkin and Sadka (2004)
even when there is only accidental bequest a 100% tax is not necessarily
desirable.
4.3.2 Altruists and life-cyclers
For long economists have rejected the idea of heterogeneous preferences.
Differences in behavior had to be explained by differences in ability,
inherited wealth or by random shocks. Over the last years, there is an
increasing awareness that to better understand the world and analyze
economic policy it is important to admit that society consists of
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individuals with different preferences in terms of altruism and time pref-
erence. In his celebrated paper, Ramsey (1928) already indicated that
within a society consisting of individuals differing in time preferences,
the most patient would end up with all the wealth in the long run.
In this section, we address the question of wealth transfer tax in a society
with two types of individuals, pure life-cyclers and altruistic savers.28
Formally, their utility function is:
uit ¼ u cit; ditþ1
 þ  iuitþ1
with i¼L for life-cyclers and thus L¼ 0 and i¼A for altruists and thus
A¼ >0. The technology is the same as above: CRS production func-
tion and we have competitive profit maximization. Population grows at a
uniform rate n and preferences are dynastic. In other words, there is a
fixed fraction  of altruistic dynasties and a fraction 1 of non-altruistic
dynasties.
It can easily be shown that government debt does not affect the
steady-state capital stock and national income. As in Ramsey, the altru-
istic (the more patient) households hold the entire capital stock. Moreover,
government debt though neutral in aggregate terms increases steady-state
inequality. A higher level of debt means a higher level of taxation to pay
for the interest payments. The taxes fall on both life-cyclers and altruists
but the interest payments go entirely to the altruist. Consequently, a
higher level of debt, or alternatively of pay-as-you-go social security,
raises the steady-state consumption and income of the altruists and
lower the steady-state consumption and income of the life-cyclers.
For the purpose at hand we are interested by the incidence of a wealth
transfer tax which in the present setting is only paid by altruistic dynasties.
Assuming that the proceeds of the tax are redistributed uniformly to
everyone, it can be shown that the tax may lower the utility of not only
the altruists but also that of the life-cyclers. This paradoxical result was
already obtained by Stiglitz (1978) in a slightly different setting.29 When
capital is taxed the quantity falls which in turns depresses the real wage.
This effect may be large enough to make any tax on wealth transfer
undesirable even from the standpoint of people who own no wealth, pay
no tax and indeed benefit from a transfer.
One should recall that this result is obtained in the steady-state. In the
short run life-cyclers could be tempted to tax inheritance and enjoy a
utility boost. If they have to vote they will vote for such a tax without
being concerned by the fate of their descendance. The political economy of
28 See Michel and Pestieau (1998, 1999, 2000, 2005).
29 See also Stiglitz (1977).
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wealth transfer thus yields a result different from steady-state social wel-
fare maximization. It explains why a tax that would be undesirable from
the steady-state standpoint can be voted on when life-cyclers hold a
majority.
One of the problems with segmenting population in spenders and savers
is that it does not reflect the fact that top wealth is not alway held by
altruistic parents but rather by individuals who have a strong preference
for wealth without bequest motives. Pestieau and Thibault (2011 in press)
study the case of a society with individuals differing in their degree of
altruism and their preference for wealth. They reach results that depend
on the type of equilibrium obtained. In the equilibrium in which only those
with wealth preference are holding wealth an estate tax is shown to
increase the welfare of everyone.
4.4 Unobservability of inherited wealth
Regardless of the type of wealth transfer taxation, inheritance or estate
tax, its actual yield is uniformly poor. It is clear that such taxes are not
successful, if their primary objective has been to reduce reliance on other
taxes. This poor yields have led some countries to seriously consider aban-
doning the tax. In any case, from a theoretical viewpoint, it is interesting
to see how other taxes should be adjusted if wealth transfers could not be
taxed anymore.
Boadway et al. (2000) and Cremer et al. (2001, 2003) have addressed the
question of the optimal taxation of labor and interest income in an econ-
omy where not only ability but also inheritance were not observed.30 In
such a setting, even with separability between leisure and consumption,
Atkinson and Stiglitz proposition does not apply and there is a good case
for taxing capital income.31 Intuitively, the additional instrument of cap-
ital income taxation now improves screening for the unobservable char-
acteristics. Roughly speaking its role is to indirectly tax inherited wealth.
This brings us back to the old public finance debate between a compre-
hensive income tax and an expenditure tax. For the latter to be desirable
one needs to be sure that inheritance can be effectively taxed. When this is
not possible, one must rely on an income tax which involves double tax-
ation of capital income.
30 As a matter of fact, one only needs to assume that a fraction of inherited wealth cannot
be observed. In this quite realistic case, the same results hold true.
31 Because of the two-dimensional heterogeneity, a tax on capital income is an effective way
of relaxing an otherwise binding self-selection constraint. This is because even under
seperability, mimicker and mimicking individual do not have the same marginal rate
of substitution between first and second period consumption.
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4.5 Investment in the human capital of children
In most societies there are two main ways of transferring financial
resources to one’s children: human and physical capital. Human capital
indeed represents a large share of voluntary intergenerational transfers in
most families, except the very rich.
As argued by Becker and Tomes (1979, 1986), parents tend to devote
resources on behalf of their children, first to education and then to phys-
ical bequest. We are not thinking of time and attention but of financial
spending. Becker and Tomes consider two transfers: e for education and
x 0 for bequest. The overall transfer is eþx whereas inherited resources
are wh(e)þ (1þ r) x where h is the (strictly concave) human capital func-
tion and r the rate of interest. Accordingly parents have to devote their
saving to their own second period consumption, to e ant to x. Take a
simple two period model; their utility function is
u c; d;whþ xð Þ ¼ u wh eð Þ  s; 1þ rð Þs e x
1þ r ;wh eð Þ þ 1þ rð Þx
 
where e, w and r are given and the bequest motive is an extended form of
joy of giving. Parents are concerned by the life-cycle income of their only
child.32 There are two possible types of solution to this problem. For some
individuals: x¼ 0 and e< e* where e* is defined by: wh0(e*)¼ 1þ r. These
individuals would like to finance high educational expenditures through a
negative bequest which is not possible. Hence, the non-negativity con-
straint on x is binding. For others e¼ e* and x>0. Whether parents
are constrained by the assumption that x 0 and thus leave 0 e< e*
depends on their wealth, their degree of (imperfect) altruism and on the
relative returns of both types of transfers (r versus wh
0
(e)).
The question at hand is whether these two types of transfer ought to be
taxed (or subsidized) differently. Even in the simple framework adopted
here both types have different economic implications. For pure efficiency
reason there is a good case for subsidizing e up to the level e* even if this
requires taxing financial bequests. Furthermore in a dynamic setting of
endogenous growth a number of papers have more or less explicitly
shown that education ought to be subsidized and/or supplied collectively.
This holds particular true when an optimal income tax is available. See
Glomm and Ravikunar (1992), Benabou (2002).
Cremer and Pestieau (2006a, 2006b) consider a model of successive gen-
erations wherein parents provide education out of some joy of giving and
with the knowledge that it increases the probability that their child(ren)
32 We have n¼ 0.
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will be highly productive. Individual are only differentiated by their degree
of productivity. The paper shows that when a non-linear income tax
is available and when there is no laundering, there is a good case for
subsidizing private education and possibly for providing some public
education.33
5 Conclusion
Even though our survey is limited to the normative aspects of wealth
transfer taxation there are a number of questions that we have not dealt
with. There is particularly the question why estate taxation is today so
unpopular that in some countries the political system is considering abol-
ishing it.
There is first the issue of avoidance and evasion which not only leads to
poor tax yields but also leads to strong departure from both vertical and
horizontal equality. Related to that, there is the issue of tax competition
within countries and among countries. In federal states one observes a real
race to the bottom regarding estate taxation. In an economic union such as
the European one there is an increasing tax competition for financial
wealth and this includes estate taxation. Another issue pertains to alleged
adverse effect of estate taxation on family businesses.
Those three issues have a real political impact and yet there is little
evidence on how important is their effect. It is thus not surprising that
there exists little theoretical work taking them into account.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Ravi Kanbur, Sandro Cigno and Serge Christophe
Kolm for suggestions.
References
Aaron, H.J. and A.H. Munnell (1992), ‘‘Reassessing the Role for Wealth
Transfer Taxes’’, National Tax Journal 45, 119–143.
Abel, A.B. (1985), ‘‘Precautionary Saving and Accidental Bequests’’,
American Economic Review 75, 777–791.
33 Grossmann and Poutvaara (2009) show that bequest taxation may improve efficiency
when combined with wage taxation.
page 32 of 37 CESifo Economic Studies, 2011
H. Cremer and P. Pestieau








Altonji, J.G., F. Hayashi and L.J. Kotlikoff (1992), ‘‘Is the Extended
Family Altruistically Linked? Direct Tests using Micro Data’’,
American Economic Review 105, 1121–1166.
Andreoni, J. (1990), ‘‘Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: a
Theory of Warm-Glow Giving?’’, Economic Journal 100, 464–477.
Arrondel, L., A. Masson and P. Pestieau (1997), ‘‘Bequests and
Inheritance: Empirical Issues and French-US Comparison’’,
in G. Erreygers and T. Vandevelde, eds., Is Inheritance Legitimate?
Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers, Springer, Berlin,
pp. 89–125.
Atkinson, A.B. and A. Sandmo (1980), ‘‘Welfare Implications of the
Taxation of Savings’’, Economic Journal 90, 529–549.
Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1972), ‘‘The Structure of Indirect Taxation
and Economic Efficiency’’, Journal of Public Economics 1, 97–119.
Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1976), ‘‘The Design of Tax Structure:
Direct Versus Indirect Taxation’’, Journal of Public Economics 6, 55–75.
Atkinson, A.B. and J.E. Stiglitz (1980), Lectures in Public Economics,
McGraw Hill, New York.
Banks, J. and P. Diamond (2010), ‘‘The Base for Direct Taxation’’,
in Insitute of Fiscal Studies, eds., Dimensions of Tax Design. The
Mirrlees Review, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 548–674.
Batina, R. and T. Ihori (2000), Consumption Tax Policy and the Taxation
of Capital Income, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Barro, R. (1974), ‘‘Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?’’, Journal of
Political Economy 82, 1095–1117.
Becker, G.S. and N. Tomes (1979), ‘‘An Equilibrium Theory of the
Distribution of Income and Intergenerational Mobility’’, Journal of
Political Economy 87, 1153–1189.
Becker, G.S. and N. Tomes (1986), ‘‘Human Capital and the Rise and Fall
of Families’’, Journal of Labor Economics 4, S1–S39.
Benabou, R. (2002), ‘‘Tax and Education Policy in an Heterogenous
Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth
and Efficiency?’’, Econometrica 70, 481–517.
Bernheim, B.D., A. Shleifer and L.H. Summers (1985), ‘‘The Strategic
Bequest Motive’’, Journal of Political Economy 93, 1045–1076.
Bevan, D.L. and J.E. Stiglitz (1979), ‘‘Intergenerational Transfers and
Inequality’’, Greek Economic Review 1, 8–26.
Blumkin, T. and E. Sadka (2004), ‘‘Estate Taxation’’, Journal of Public
Economics 88, 1–21.
CESifo Economic Studies, 2011 page 33 of 37
Wealth Transfer Taxation








Boadway, R., M. Marchand and P. Pestieau (2000), ‘‘Redistribution with
Unobservable Bequests: a Case for Capital Income Tax’’, Scandinavian
Journal of Economics 102, 1–15.
Boadway, R., E. Chamberlain and C. Emmerson (2010), ‘‘Taxation of
Wealth and Wealth Transfers’’, in Insitute of Fiscal Studies, eds.,
Dimensions of Tax Design. The Mirrlees Review, Oxford University
Press, Oxford, pp. 737–814.
Brenner, G.A. (1985), ‘‘Why did Inheritance Laws Change?’’, International
Review of Law and Economics 5, 91–106.
Chamley, C. (1986), ‘‘Optimal Taxation of Capital Income in General
Equilibrium with Infinite Lives’’, Economica 54, 607–622.
Cigno, S. (1991), Economics of the Family, Oxford University Press,
Oxford.
Coleman, W.J. (2000), ‘‘Welfare and Optimum Dynamic Taxation of
Consumption and Income’’, Journal of Public Economic 76, 1–39.
Cox, D. (1987), ‘‘Motives for Private Income Transfers’’, Journal of
Political Economy 95, 508–546.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1988), ‘‘A Case for Differential Inheritance
Taxation’’, Annales d’Economie et de Statistiques 9, 167–182.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1991), ‘‘Bequest, Filial Attention and
Fertility’’, Economica 58, 359–375.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1996), ‘‘Bequests as a Heir ‘‘Discipline
Device’’, Journal of Population Economics 9, 405–414.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (1998), ‘‘Delaying Inter Vivos Transmission
under Asymmetric Information’’, Southern Economic Journal 65,
322–331.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2001), ‘‘Non-linear Taxation of Bequests,
Equal Sharing Rules and The Trade-off Between Intra- and
Inter-Family Inequalities’’, Journal of Public Economics 79, 35–54.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2006a), ‘‘Intergenerational Transfer of
Human Capital and Optimal Income Taxation’’, Journal of Public
Economic Theory 8, 529–545.
Cremer, H. and P. Pestieau (2006b), ‘‘Wealth Transfer Taxation: a Survey
of the Theoretical Literature’’, in S.C. Kolm and J. Mercier Ythier, eds.,
Handbook on Altruism, Giving and Reciprocity, vol. 2, North Holland,
Amsterdam, pp. 1108–1134.
Cremer, H., D. Kessler and P. Pestieau (1993), ‘‘Education for Attention:
a Nash Bargaining Solution to the Bequest-as-Exchange Model’’, Public
Finance 48, 85–97.
page 34 of 37 CESifo Economic Studies, 2011
H. Cremer and P. Pestieau








Cremer, H., P. Pestieau and J.-C. Rochet (2001), ‘‘Direct Versus Indirect
Taxation: the Design of the Tax Structure Revisited’’, International
Economic Review 42, 781–799.
Cremer, H., P. Pestieau and J.-C. Rochet (2003), ‘‘Capital Income
Taxation when Inherited Wealth is not Observable’’, Journal of Public
Economics 87, 2475–2490.
Davies, J.B. (1981), ‘‘Uncertain Lifetime, Consumption and Dissaving in
Retirement’’, Journal of Political Economy 89, 561–577.
Diamond, P. (1965), ‘‘National Debt in a Neoclassical Growth Model’’,
American Economic Review 58, 1126–1150.
Diamond, P. (2006), ‘‘Comment on M. Golosov, A. Tsyvinski, I. Werning,
New Dynamic Public Finance: A User’s Guide’’, NBER
Macroeconomics Annual 2006, 365–379.
Erregeyers, G. and T. Vandevelde (1997), Is Inheritance Legitimate?
Ethical and Economic Aspects of Wealth Transfers, Springer, Berlin.
Gale, W.G., J.R. Hines and J. Slemrod (eds.) (2000), Rethinking Estate and
Gift Taxation, Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
Glomm, G. and R. Ravikunar (1992), ‘‘Public Versus Private Investment
in Human Capital: Endogenous Growth and Income Inequality’’,
Journal of Political Economy 100, 818–834.
Golosov, M., A. Tsyvinski and I. Werning (2007), ‘‘New Dynamic Public
Finance: A User’s Guide’’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2006,
317–363.
Grossmann, V. and P. Poutvaara (2009), ‘‘Pareto-Improving Bequest
Taxation’’, International Tax and Public Finance 16, 647–669.
Hammond, P. (1988), ‘‘Altruism’’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and
P. Newman, eds., New Palgrave: a Dictionary of Economics,
Macmillan Press, London, pp. 85–87.
Harsanyi, J. (1995), ‘‘A Theory of Social Values and a Rule Utilitarian
Theory of Morality’’, Social Choice and Welfare 12, 319–344.
Judd, K.L. (1985), ‘‘Redistributive Taxation in a Simple Perfect Foresight
Model’’, Journal of Public Economics 28, 59–83.
Kaplow, L. (2000), ‘‘A Framework for Assessing Estate and Gift
Taxation’’, in W.G. Gale, J.R. Hines and J. Slemrod, eds., Rethinking
Estate and Gift Taxation, Brookings Institution, Washington DC.
Kopczuk, W. (2001), ‘‘Optimal Estate Taxation in the Steady-State’’,
unpublished.
Kopczuk, W. (2003), ‘‘The Trick is to Live. Is the Estate Tax Social
Security for the Rich?’’, Journal of Political Economy 111, 1318–1341.
CESifo Economic Studies, 2011 page 35 of 37
Wealth Transfer Taxation








Kotlikoff, L.J. and A. Spivak (1981), ‘‘The Family as an Incomplete
Annuities Market’’, Journal of Political Economy 89, 372–391.
Masson, A. and P. Pestieau (1997), ‘‘Bequests Motives and Models of
Inheritance: a Survey of the Literature’’, in G. Erreygers and
T. Vandevelde, eds., Is Inheritance Justified?, Springer, Berlin, pp. 54–88.
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (1998), ‘‘Fiscal Policy in a Growth Model with
both Altruistic and Non-Altruistic Agents’’, Southern Economic Journal
64, 682–697.
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (1999), ‘‘Fiscal Policy in a Growth Model where
Individuals Differ with Regard to Altruism and Labor Supply’’, Journal
of Public Economic Theory 1, 187–203.
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (2000), ‘‘Tax-Transfer Policy with Altruists
and Non-altruists’’, in L.A. Ge´rard-Varet, S.C. Kolm and
J. Mercier Ythier, eds., The Economics of Reciprocity, Giving and
Altruism, Macmillan, International Economic Association, London,
pp. 275–284.
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (2002), ‘‘Wealth Transfer Taxation with both
Accidental and Desired Bequests’’, unpublished.
Michel, P. and P. Pestieau (2005), ‘‘Fiscal Policy with Agents Differing in
Altruism and in Ability’’, Economica 72, 121–136.
Pestieau, P. (1974), ‘‘Optimal Taxation and Discount Rate for Public
Investment in a Growth Setting’’, Journal of Public Economics 3,
217–235.
Pestieau, P. (2000), ‘‘Gifts, Wills and Inheritance Law’’, in B. Bouckaert
and G. De Geest, eds., Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, vol. 3,
Edward Edgar, Northampton, MA, pp. 888–906.
Pestieau, P. (2003), ‘‘The Role of Gift and Estate Transfers in the United
States and in Europe’’, in A. Munnell and A. Sunden, eds., Death and
Dollars, The Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC, pp. 64–85.
Pestieau, P. and M. Sato (2008), ‘‘Estate Taxation with both Accidental
and Planned Bequests’’, Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and
Economics (APJAE) 15, 223–240.
Pestieau, P. and E. Thibault (2011), ‘‘Love thy Children or Money -
Reflections on Debt Neutrality and Estate Taxation’’, Economic
Theory (forthcoming).
Ramsey, F.P. (1928), ‘‘A Mathematical Theory of Saving’’, Economic
Journal 38, 543–559.
Rosenthal, P.A. (1991), ‘‘Pratiques Successorales et Fe´condite´’’, Economie
et Pre´vision, 100–101, 231–238.
page 36 of 37 CESifo Economic Studies, 2011
H. Cremer and P. Pestieau








Saez, E. (2002), ‘‘Optimal Progressive Capital Income Taxes in the Infinite
Horizon Model’’, NBER Working Paper No. 9046.
Smith, R.S. (2001), ‘‘Personal Wealth Taxation and the European Union’’,
University of Alberta, unpublished.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1977), ‘‘Equality, Taxation and Inheritance’’, in W. Krelle
and A. Shorrocks, eds., Personal Income Distribution, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, pp. 271–303.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1978), ‘‘Notes on Estate Taxes, Redistribution and the
Concept of Balanced Growth Path Incidence’’, Journal of Political
Economy 86, 137–150.
Stiglitz, J.E. (1987), ‘‘Pareto Efficient and Optimal Taxation in the
New Welfare Economics’’, in A.J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein, eds.,
Handbook of Public Economics, vol. 2, North-Holland, Amsterdam,
pp. 991–1042.
CESifo Economic Studies, 2011 page 37 of 37
Wealth Transfer Taxation
 by guest on M
ay 11, 2011
ce
sifo.oxfordjournals.org
D
ow
nloaded from
 
